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Abstract 
Comparative studies on cross-national policy transfer and diffusion emphasize an impressing 
degree of policy convergence in many areas. This holds true, in particular, for the 
environmental field. However, we are still confronted with limited knowledge about the 
mechanisms accounting for this phenomenon. Against this backdrop, we theoretically 
investigate the impact of three different convergence mechanisms that are generally seen as 
central sources of cross-national policy convergence: regulatory competition, international 
cooperation and transnational communication. We focus not only on the isolated effects of 
each mechanism, but also on the effects of their interaction. As will be shown, the empirically 
rather likely interaction of different mechanisms constitutes a plausible explanation for the 
still puzzling gap between the theoretical prediction of a race to the bottom through 
regulatory competition and the lacking empirical support for this hypothesis. 
Zusammenfassung 
Vergleichende Studien zu Politiktransfer und Politikdiffusion haben für viele Bereiche eine 
beträchtliche Konvergenz von Politiken festgestellt. Das gilt insbesondere für die 
Umweltpolitik. Es ist jedoch noch wenig über die Mechanismen bekannt, die dieses 
Phänomen verursachen. In diesem theoretischen Beitrag werden drei Faktoren analysiert, 
die als wichtige internationale Antriebskräfte der zwischenstaatlichen Politikkonvergenz 
gelten: Regulierungswettbewerb, internationale Kooperation und Harmonisierung sowie 
transnationale Kommunikation und Policy-Lernen. Wir betrachten dabei nicht nur die 
jeweiligen isolierten Wirkungen der einzelnen Faktoren, sondern auch die Effekte ihrer 
Interaktion. Es wird gezeigt, dass die empirisch recht wahrscheinliche Interaktion dieser 
Mechanismen eine plausible Erklärung bietet für die Kluft zwischen der theoretischen 
Vorhersage eines „race to the bottom“ der umweltpolitischen Standards und dem Mangel an 
empirischen Belegen für ein solches Ergebnis. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Comparative studies on cross-national policy transfer and diffusion emphasize an impressing 
degree of environmental policy convergence which cannot only be observed across the 
member states of the European Union (EU), but also at the level of the OECD (Jänicke and 
Weidner 1997; Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke 2001). On the other hand, research findings 
provide only limited empirical support for the often predicted race to the bottom as a result of 
regulatory competition between states (Tobey 1990; Levinson 1996, 1997; Wilson 1996). 
Convergence obviously does not coincide with a general decrease in environmental 
protection levels.  
Which factors account for the striking degree of environmental policy convergence and how 
can we explain that convergence levels only in rare cases reflect the outcome of a race to 
the bottom? In the literature, we are confronted with still limited knowledge about the causes 
and conditions of cross-national policy convergence (Drezner 2001; Hoberg 2001). These 
deficits hamper the analysis of causal relationships between individual convergence 
mechanisms and their effects. They are even more pronounced, however, when it comes to 
the question of how different mechanisms might interact – an empirically rather likely 
constellation.  
It is the objective of this article to address these analytical problems. We aim to develop 
theoretical expectations about the degree and levels of cross-national policy convergence 
not only for individual mechanisms, but also with respect to potential interaction effects. We 
concentrate on three mechanisms, which are generally viewed as the most important driving 
forces of policy convergence, namely, regulatory competition, international cooperation and 
transnational communication. We develop our argument against the empirical background of 
policy convergence in the environmental field. Although many of our considerations might be 
generally valid, this more restrictive approach is justified by the fact that relevant 
convergence mechanisms and their effects might vary across policy areas.  
The article proceeds as follows. In a first step, we introduce the different convergence 
mechanisms under investigation and our conception of policy convergence (section 2), In a 
second step, we develop hypotheses not only on the conditions under which cross-national 
policy convergence will occur, but also on the degree and level to which national policies 
convergence. While in section 3, the focus is on the analysis of individual convergence 
mechanisms, the interaction effects between different mechanisms are analyzed in section 
4.  
2 — Holzinger and Knill  / Competition, Communication and Cooperation — I H S 
 
1 Mechanisms and Concepts of Environmental 
Policy Convergence 
Cross-national policy convergence is generally defined as increase in policy similarity 
between countries over time (Bennett 1991, 219). Policy convergence thus constitutes the 
result of a process; it implies a movement from diverse positions towards some common 
point. Knowing that national policies are alike tells us nothing about convergence. While this 
aspect is rather uncontested in the literature, the picture is less clear when it comes to 
underlying causes and conditions of convergence. Although there is considerable overlap, 
the type and number of identified mechanisms strongly vary, depending on the underlying 
theoretical focus of the different studies.  
In view of this conceptual variety, it is not our intention to provide an encompassing 
classification of convergence mechanisms. Rather we concentrate on the analysis of three 
mechanisms which are generally considered as major driving forces of cross-national policy 
convergence: regulatory competition, international cooperation, and transnational 
communication (Bennett 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000; 
Hoberg 2001).  
1.1 Three Convergence Mechanisms 
A first mechanism of cross-national policy convergence is regulatory competition which 
generally emerges as a result of economic integration. The concept of regulatory competition 
is based on economic theories of systems competition or regulatory competition (Tiebout 
1956; Oates and Schwab 1988). While the economic literature focuses on normative 
questions, such as the effect of systems competition on efficiency or democracy, the political 
science literature has concentrated on the question of whether regulatory competition 
actually works and whether it induces races to the top or bottom. 
With the increasing integration of global markets and the abolition of national trade barriers, 
the international mobility of goods, workers and capital puts pressure on national 
governments to redesign domestic market regulations in order to attract foreign investment 
and to avoid regulatory burdens restricting the competitiveness of domestic industries 
threatening to shift their activities elsewhere (Goodman and Pauly 1993; Keohane and Nye 
2000).  
This way, regulatory competition among governments may lead to a race to the bottom in 
environmental policy, implying policy convergence at the lowest common denominator: 
states will gravitate towards the regulatory level of the most laissez-faire country (Drezner 
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2001, 59). However, notwithstanding the seemingly clear and concise argument, the 
empirical literature provides only limited support for it (van Beers and van de Bergh 1999; 
Levinson 1996, 1997; Tobey 1990; Vogel 1995; Wilson 1997).  
The second convergence mechanism under investigation refers to legal obligations 
emerging from international cooperation. As a result of international agreements, national 
governments are legally required to adopt policies and programs (Bennett 1991, 225; 
Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 15). This mechanism is traced to the existence of 
interdependencies which push governments to resolve common problems through 
cooperation within international institutions, hence sacrificing some independence for the 
good of the community (Hoberg 2001, 127). Once established, institutional arrangements will 
constrain and shape domestic policy choices, even as they are constantly challenged and 
reformed by their member states (Martin and Simmons 1998, 743). However, as member 
states voluntarily engage in international cooperation and actively influence corresponding 
decisions and arrangements, the impact of international legal obligations on national policies 
constitutes no hierarchical process; it can rather be interpreted as "negotiated transfer" 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 15). 
Finally, the literature emphasizes varying convergence mechanisms which are based on 
transnational communication. The first scenario of policy emulation implies the simple 
copying of policy decisions taken elsewhere. This pattern is generally explained by a broad 
variety of factors, including the number of countries which have already adopted a certain 
policy (Meyer and Rowan 1977), the striving for legitimacy in constellations of high 
uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 70), the desire of actors not to be left behind (Meyer 
et al. 1997), the existence of time-pressures (Bennett 1991, 223), or the striving to avoid high 
costs of information which are probably much less with simple imitation than with more 
demanding forms of learning (Simmons and Elkins 2003). 
Second, policy convergence can be the result of learning processes, understood as the 
rational utilization of available experience elsewhere. In contrast to policy emulation, 
however, the concept of learning implies that there may be considerable deviation from the 
models found in other countries (Rose 1991). Learning through transnational communication 
is not restricted to bilateral policy transfer, but can also result from the development of 
common problem perceptions and corresponding solutions within transnational elite 
networks or epistemic communities (Haas 1992). Convergence in this sense results from the 
development of shared ideas and beliefs amongst a relatively coherent and enduring 
network of elites engaging in regular interaction at the transnational level (Bennett 1991, 
224).  
A third convergence factor linked to transnational communication is the promotion of policy 
models by international institutions. They often play a highly active role, driving the spread of 
distinctive policy approaches through performance comparisons. Cross-national policy 
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transfer is stimulated by international agreements on broad goals and standards that national 
policies should aim to achieve, institutionalized peer review and identification of best practice 
(benchmarking) as well as the construction of league tables ranking national policies in terms 
of performance to previously agreed criteria (Humphreys 2002, 54). In constantly searching 
for new policy ideas, disseminating best practice and evaluating domestic policy 
performance, international institutions function as mediators of cross-national policy transfer, 
driving national governments to adopt successful policy models (Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke 
2001, 10).  
1.2 Isolated Effects and Interaction of Mechanisms 
Analyzing the impact of these mechanisms on environmental policy convergence, the first 
question to be addressed is: Which effects have the mechanisms individually? It is difficult, 
however, to isolate the effects of each mechanism empirically. However, not every 
mechanism is effective in all countries and all environmental policy areas. For example, 
regulatory competition is only effective among market economies and in environmental 
policy areas where a policy change factually affects the competitive position of a country. 
Similarly, international cooperation does not take place in all fields of environmental policy. 
Thus, the conditions under which the mechanisms affect policy convergence differ for each 
factor. They have individual "scopes of effectiveness", which are not fully congruent but have 
intersections with the other factors. 
The second question to be addressed is: What are the interaction effects of the three 
mechanisms? Are the convergence effects strengthened by the interaction of several 
factors? Are they diminished? Or does one factor dominate the other(s) and if so, under 
which conditions? The scopes of effectiveness of the mechanisms potentially overlap both 
with respect to policies and to countries.  
1.3 Research Questions and Conception of Convergence 
In the following sections, we develop hypotheses on both individual and interaction effects of 
the three convergence mechanisms. They are related to two aspects:  
(1) the expected degree of convergence implied by the underlying mechanisms; and 
(2) the expected level of convergence for each mechanism (Can we expect a regulatory 
race to the top or a race to the bottom?). 
With respect to convergence, we focus on policy output; i.e., the policies adopted by a 
government. We do not consider policy outcomes, because they are usually affected by 
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many intervening variables, and hence can only be indirectly related to the causal 
mechanisms of convergence. It would not be too surprising if we found convergence at the 
level of output, but divergence at the level of outcome (Inkeles 1981, 32). 
In many cases, it is impossible to formulate hypotheses on the level of convergence. The 
level or "point" of convergence is usually related to the extent of state intervention or to the 
strictness of a regulation. Lax standards or laissez-faire policies are identified with the 
"bottom", strict standards or interventionist policies with the "top" (Drezner 2001, 59-64). 
However, it is not always easy to identify what the top and the bottom is in environmental 
policy. When general principles or policy instruments are compared (such as sustainable 
development or the polluter pays principle), it does not make much sense to speak of levels 
of convergence. Only in rare cases a certain instrument or policy idea can be assumed to 
provide stricter (or less strict) regulation than another one. Therefore, the level of 
convergence can only be measured when the policies under consideration come in degrees 
which can be associated with a normative judgment on the quality of an intervention. Typical 
examples are the levels of environmental standards or taxes.  
The idea of convergence of policies implies decrease in variation of policies among the 
countries under consideration over time. Thus, convergence is the decrease of standard 
deviation from time t1 to t2. A change in the regulatory level implies an upward or downward 
shift of the mean from time t1 to t2 (Botcheva and Martin 2001, 4). Convergence at the top or 
bottom presupposes therefore both decrease of standard deviation and a shift of the mean. 
To assess the extent of convergence, as well as shifts in the level of regulation a point of 
reference is needed. We assume as the reference point a situation where no mechanism is 
at work and where the policies of the countries under consideration are characterized by 
diversity (assumption 1).1 
                                                    
1  A number of further assumptions will be made in the course of the analysis. For the sake of clarity, all 
assumptions made in the text are listed in the annex. 
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2 Theoretical Expectations:  
Individual Convergence Mechanisms 
Potential interaction effects between different convergence mechanisms can hardly be 
understood without knowledge about their individual effects on the degree and level of policy 
convergence. In the following, we thus develop hypotheses on the individual effects of 
regulatory competition, international cooperation, and transnational communication.  
2.1 Regulatory Competition 
From theories of regulatory competition (cf. Scharpf 1996, 1997; Vogel 1995; Holzinger 
2003) several expectations about the convergence effects of this mechanism as well as its 
conditions of effectiveness can be derived. Regarding the degree of convergence, the basic 
expectation is that policy similarity across countries increases with the extent to which they 
are exposed to competitive pressures following from high economic integration (Drezner 
2001, 59).  
It follows from this argument that convergence effects can only be expected if two conditions 
are fulfilled. The first requirement is a country's exposure to international market pressures. 
In the absence of such pressures, no convergence will be observed. Lacking competitive 
pressures can either be the result of trade barriers or of lacking competition in or between 
non-market economies. In the latter case, which applies, for instance, to the Eastern 
European countries before 1990, even in constellations of high economic interaction and 
exchange, competitive pressures will remain very low.  
Second, convergence effects will emerge only for those policies which affect competition 
among national industries. No convergence is predicted for policies subject to low 
competitive pressures from international markets. This holds true for all environmental 
policies that are not directly related to products or production processes, such as ambient 
quality standards, or nature protection. The same applies to trade-related policies if their 
effects on production costs are low.  
Theories of regulatory competition imply that countries move their levels of regulation 
towards an equilibrium. As a consequence, there is full convergence only at the end of the 
process. During the process there is ever increasing convergence. If other convergence 
mechanisms become effective some time after the mechanism of regulatory competition, we 
assume increased but not yet full convergence (assumption 2).  
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There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the level of convergence caused by 
regulatory competition. In this context, a distinction is often made between product and 
production process standards (Scharpf 1996, 1997; Holzinger 2003). While for product 
standards, several factors might inhibit a race to the bottom and even trigger a race to the 
top, we find a widely shared expectation that policy convergence will occur at the lowest 
common denominator in the case of process standards.  
In contrast to process standards, industries in both low-regulating and high-regulating 
countries have a common interest in harmonizing product standards to avoid the costs of 
market segmentation. Whether harmonization occurs at the level of high-regulating or low-
regulating countries depends on a number of additional factors. Most important is the extent 
to which high-regulating countries are able to factually enforce stricter standards. If it is 
possible to erect exceptional trade barriers, as for example for health or environmental 
reasons under EU and WTO rules, convergence at a high level of regulation is likely 
(Scharpf 1997, 523; Vogel 1995). If such exceptional trade barriers cannot be justified, by 
contrast, competitive pressure is expected to induce governments to lower their 
environmental standards. Moreover, an upward move of regulatory levels can only be 
expected if the harmonization advantage is valued higher by business and governments than 
the cost difference between high and low levels of regulation (Holzinger 2003, 196).  
In addition to these factors, a race to the top on product standards can be induced if national 
regulations serve as a certificate of superior product quality that is rewarded by the market. 
This constellation, in which national governments upgrade their own regulation to protect 
their firms against attractive, more highly regulated foreign competitors, seems to explain 
some aspects of the race to the top in international banking regulation (Kapstein 1994). 
There is limited evidence, however, for similar scenarios in the environmental field.  
By contrast, none of these conditions avoiding downward pressures on national regulation is 
given for process standards. There are neither harmonization incentives to avoid market 
segmentations, nor do national governments have the opportunity to erect exceptional trade 
barriers. Hence, if the regulation of production processes increases the costs of products, 
regulatory competition will generally exert downward pressures on economic regulations 
(Scharpf 1997, 524).  
For reasons of terminological simplicity, we use the term product standards only for those 
specific constellations in which product regulation is characterized by large harmonization 
advantages and the possibility to erect exceptional trade barriers, hence implying a race to 
the top. With process standards, by contrast, we refer to all constellations of (process and 
product) regulation characterized by the exclusion of exceptional trade barriers and/or the 
lack of harmonization advantages, hence leading to a race to the bottom.  
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Hypotheses: Regulatory Competition and Environmental Policy Convergence 
1.1 Degree of Convergence 
Policy convergence through regulatory competition increases with the extent to which countries 
are exposed to competitive pressures following from high economic integration. 
1.2 Level of Convergence 
Whenever there is a strict free trade regime, excluding exceptional trade barriers, there will be a 
decrease of both standard deviation and mean, irrespective of the type of regulation (race to the 
bottom). 
In case of product regulation there will be a decrease of standard deviation but an increase of 
mean, given large harmonization advantages and the possibility of exceptional trade barriers 
(race to the top). 
 
2.2 International Cooperation 
The extent to which legal obligation emerging from international cooperation actually leads to 
the convergence of policies across countries is affected by a number of factors. First, it is 
obvious that convergence effects can only be expected amongst the member countries of 
the corresponding institution or regime with obligatory potential. At the same time, the 
obligatory impact of international institutions is likely only for policy areas in which they have 
in fact obligatory potential; i.e., the power to enact legally binding rules. To fulfill this 
condition it is thus not sufficient that a certain policy area falls under the jurisdiction of an 
institution with obligatory potential, but that the institution actually has obligatory powers in 
this policy area.  
Another important factor influencing the degree of convergence is the type of harmonization 
used. Convergence effects are much stronger if policies rely on total or minimum 
harmonization of national regulations, hence significantly restricting the potential for 
domestic interpretations and deviations. The picture looks different, however, if policies are 
defined in a less rigid way. In this respect, varying techniques are conceivable, for example, 
differentiated regulatory requirements or mutual recognition. In these constellations, 
persisting diversity or divergence rather than convergence of national policies constitutes a 
plausible outcome.  
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These different techniques can be ranked in terms of their impact on the degree of cross-
national convergence. Convergence effects will be most pronounced for total harmonization, 
followed by minimum harmonization, differentiated regulatory requirements and mutual 
recognition. Differentiated harmonization has similar effects as total harmonization. The only 
difference is that it cannot be expected to lead to full convergence. Mutual recognition as a 
technique of international cooperation has the same effects as regulatory competition alone. 
In the following, we develop hypotheses only for total and minimum harmonization, given 
their stronger effects on convergence.  
In addition to the specific regulatory technique applied, the converging impact of legal 
requirements depends on the capacities of the international institution to enforce legally 
binding rules and, related to this issue, the actual compliance by the member states. For the 
following analysis we assume that there are no enforcement problems and all countries fully 
comply with international law (assumption 3).  
Having elaborated on the conditions and degree under which international cooperation 
results in the convergence of national policies, we still have no information on the 
convergence level. With respect to legal obligation, the answer to this question basically 
depends on factors such as decision rules, interest constellations and the distribution of 
power between the involved actors (typically national governments) which shape the 
negotiations at the level of international institutions.  
In light of this constellation, which might vary from case to case, it is difficult to develop 
general hypotheses on the conditions under which the negotiated agreement reflects a shift 
of mean towards either the top or the bottom. In principle, every result (most probably within 
the span of existing national regulations) is possible, depending on the dynamics of the 
international decision-making process. The literature generally predicts an outcome which 
reflects a compromise in the middle between countries favoring extreme positions of either 
rather strict or weak regulations (Drezner 2001, 61). Therefore, we assume that the level of 
harmonization will take place at the mean of the national regulation levels (assumption 4).  
However, even if we assume that the final agreement reflects a compromise between high-
regulating and low-regulating countries, we still need to know whether and in which direction 
the mean of national regulatory levels will change after a decision has been taken. Predicted 
mean changes are different for total and minimum harmonization.  
In the case of total harmonization, the expected result is that convergence coincides with no 
mean changes of regulatory levels. The required upward and downward moves of national 
standards will neutralize each other, hence implying no departure of the mean from the 
original position. The constellation looks different, however, in case of minimum 
harmonization. Here it is still possible for countries with a preference for higher regulatory 
levels to enact standards beyond the minimum level specified in international agreements. 
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While deviations to the top are therefore still possible, countries with lower standards are 
obliged to raise their standards levels at least to the international minimum level. Minimum 
harmonization is thus likely to result in shifting the regulatory mean upward. This expectation 
rests on the assumption that not all high-regulating countries will lower their standards 
towards the minimum level (assumption 5). 
Hypotheses: International Cooperation and Environmental Policy Convergence 
2.1 Degree of Convergence 
Policy convergence through international cooperation increases with the extent of integration of 
nation states into international institutions. 
Policy convergence increases with the extent to which legal obligations require the 
harmonization of national policies. 
2.2 Level of Convergence 
If legal obligation requires the total harmonization of national standards, the level of 
convergence implies no significant changes of the mean. 
If legal obligation requires the minimum harmonization of national standards, the level of 
convergence implies an upward shift of the mean. 
 
2.3 Transnational Communication 
Under which conditions do the mechanisms associated with transnational communication 
actually lead to cross-national policy convergence? It is obvious that this mechanism will be 
effective only for those countries and policies for which corresponding communication 
networks exist and in which the countries are actually represented.  
What are the factors affecting the degree of policy convergence if this basic condition for the 
effectiveness of transnational communication is fulfilled? First, the potential that this 
mechanism drives the similarity of national policies increases with the density of information 
exchange within transnational networks (Simmons and Elkins 2003). This includes not only 
the frequency of interaction, but also the breadth of interaction; i.e., the functional 
differentiation of transnational networks. It is well-acknowledged in the literature that 
interaction density between states increases with their membership in international 
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institutions which strongly facilitate and intensify transnational information exchange (Bennett 
1991, Haas 1992).  
Second, convergence effects might increase with the extent to which policy transfer occurs 
between countries with strong cultural linkages. In their search for relevant policy models, 
decision-makers often look to the experiences of those countries with which they share an 
especially close set of cultural ties (Rose 1991; Strang and Meyer 1993). Especially in 
constellations characterized by high uncertainty about the consequences of policy choices, 
decision-makers are likely to imitate the practices of nations with which they share linguistic, 
religious, historical or other cultural linkages (Friedkin 1993; Simmons and Elkins 2003).  
Under which condition does transnational communication lead to an upward or downward 
shift of convergence levels? To answer this question, the different mechanisms linked to 
transnational communication can be divided into two subgroups, namely policy copying and 
benchmarking.  
Under policy copying, we summarize the mechanisms of emulation and learning. This can be 
justified by the fact that in reality it will hardly be possible to decide whether the adoption of 
similar policies was the result of simple imitation or deliberate lesson-drawing (Bennett 
1991). In the case of copying, no predictions about the level of convergence are possible. 
The fact that other states adopt a certain innovation or copy policy concepts successfully 
applied in other countries does not automatically imply that this results in an increase in 
regulatory levels. It might well be the case that states adopt less demanding regulations, 
following corresponding patterns in other countries (e.g. replacing of interventionist 
regulation by self-regulation). The range of possible convergence levels thus encompasses 
the whole range of regulation levels given in the involved countries.  
The picture is less open if transnational communication is directed at the promotion of policy 
models by benchmarking activities of international organizations. As a result of the 
competition of ideas emerging from the dissemination and evaluation of best practice, 
benchmarking can be expected to result in an overall strengthening of regulatory concepts; 
hence inducing an upward shift of the mean. Since international organizations will generally 
promote the most progressive national approach, we assume that the benchmark will be set 
at the level of the highest-regulating country (assumption 6). Notwithstanding the dynamics 
underlying the promotional activities of international organizations, however, the voluntary 
nature of this approach should not be overlooked. As a consequence, we assume that only 
some countries will move their regulatory levels to the benchmark, while others will stick to 
their existing regulations (assumption 7).  
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Hypotheses: Transnational Communication and Environmental Policy Convergence 
3.1 Degree of Convergence 
The extent to which the exchange of knowledge in transnational networks results in cross-
national policy convergence increases with the density of interaction and cultural linkages 
among the involved states. 
3.2 Level of Convergence 
If exchange of knowledge in transnational networks is based on policy copying, the level of 
convergence might imply either no mean change or an upward or downward shift of the mean. 
If exchange of knowledge in transnational networks is based on benchmarking, the level of 
convergence implies an upward shift of the mean. 
I H S —Holzinger and Knill / Competition, Cooperation and Communication — 13 
3 Theoretical Expectations: Interaction Effects 
In the following, we develop hypotheses on the interaction effects of the three convergence 
mechanisms. We first delineate the scope of effectiveness for the interaction of several 
factors and then formulate hypotheses on the degree and level of convergence. The 
interaction analysis pursues the aim of comparing situations where no mechanism is 
effective to situations where both or all three mechanisms interact. In some cases the 
consequence of the interaction depends on the sequence in which the mechanisms become 
effective. Therefore we analyze the interactions in a sequential mode: We start from the 
situation where no mechanism is at work. Then we sequentially introduce mechanism 1, 
mechanism 2, and in case of triple interaction mechanism 3. Next, we change the sequence, 
introducing first mechanism 2, second mechanism 1, and so forth.  
3.1 Interaction of Competition and Cooperation 
The interaction of regulatory competition and international cooperation limits the scope of 
effectiveness to countries which are members of international organizations with obligatory 
potential and which belong to a common market. Moreover, interaction will be effective only 
for those policies for which the international organization has the power to enact binding 
international law and which affect the competitive position of national industries. This is true 
for the binding international standards for products and production processes.  
The interaction effects of cooperation and competition depend on the type of legal 
harmonization used, total or minimum harmonization. With total harmonization, international 
cooperation dominates regulatory competition. Whenever total harmonization is agreed 
upon, regulatory competition cannot develop or it will stop. Therefore, the interaction of both 
mechanisms leads to full convergence at the level of harmonization. The level of 
convergence, however, depends not only on the type of policy – product or process 
regulation – but also on the sequence of interaction.  
The graphical representations in Figure 1 depict three cases of changes in standard 
deviation and mean. We first assume that after an initial phase of diversity of countries' 
policies (t1), the mechanism of regulatory competition starts working (t1 to t2), and after some 
time international cooperation takes place (t2 to t3). The mean in t1 is given by the median 
country, as for simplicity the regulatory distance between the countries is assumed to be 
equal in the graphical illustrations (assumption 8).  
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Figure 1: Competition and Total Harmonization 
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What happens to the standard deviation and the mean in case of product regulation (Figure 
1.1)? While both remain constant in the first phase, after t1 the standard deviation decreases, 
whereas the mean increases from t1 to t2 (race to the top). In t2 an international agreement is 
concluded which totally harmonizes the product standard. Following assumption 4, 
harmonization takes place at the mean in t2. Thus, in the next phase standard deviation 
decreases to zero as a result of harmonization (full convergence at the standard), implying 
that the level of the mean from now on is the same as the level of the standard. Therefore, 
the interaction leads to full convergence and an upward shift of the mean from m (t1) to 
m (t2), which is at the same time m (t3). For production standards the process and the result 
are similar. The only difference is that regulatory competition in this case drives the mean 
downward before total harmonization becomes effective (Figure 1.2).  
What happens when total harmonization were to become effective before regulatory 
competition? This scenario does not make much sense, as total harmonization supersedes 
regulatory competition. This sequence implies however, that the level of convergence is 
different than in the two cases described above. Total harmonization takes place at the 
mean m (t1) of countries' positions in the initial phase. All countries converge to this level and 
stay there, as they are not permitted to deviate. There is no shift of the mean upward or 
downward in this scenario, and there is no difference between product or process standards 
(Figures 1.3 and 1.4).  
In contrast to total harmonization, the isolated effect of minimum harmonization does not 
lead to full convergence of policies. Cooperation does not fully replace competition. In this 
case the two factors truly interact. Again, however, the type of standard and the interaction 
sequence lead to different levels of convergence. The four cases are represented in Figure 
2. 
We start with the assumption that regulatory competition is at work (t1) before international 
cooperation leads to the setting of a minimum standard (t2). In the case of product standards, 
regulatory competition will lead to a decrease of standard deviation and an increase of the 
mean level of regulation (hypothesis 1.2). In t2 minimum harmonization is introduced at the 
current mean. Legal obligation causes countries with policies below the mean to raise their 
standards to the minimum standard level. Countries with regulations above the minimum 
standard are not obliged to lower their standard levels. There is a high probability, however, 
that they do so. This can be traced to the fact that – as soon as minimum standards are 
established – high-regulating countries are no longer permitted to erect exceptional trade 
barriers on the ground that products from low-regulating countries complying with the 
minimum standard constitute a threat to national health. Assuming that stricter product 
standards coincide with higher production costs and hence competitive disadvantages, high-
regulating countries have a strong incentive to reduce their regulations to the level of the 
minimum standard. Thus, full convergence at the level of the minimum standard occurs. 
Regulatory competition shifts the mean upward from m (t1) to m (t2), cooperation fixes the 
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mean at m (t2) as the minimum standard, and finally, cooperation and competition drive all 
countries towards the minimum standard, such that mean and minimum standard become 
identical at m (t3) (Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2: Competition and Minimum Harmonization 
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In the case of process standards the development is similar (Figure 2.2). Again, the 
difference is solely that regulatory competition in the first phase leads to a shift of the mean 
downward, and thus the minimum standard will be set at a lower level. After minimum 
harmonization, all countries converge to the standard level, some because they are obliged 
to raise their standards, others because regulatory competition exerts a downward pressure 
on process standards (hypothesis 1.2).  
What happens if the sequence is changed and minimum harmonization is effective before 
regulatory competition? We start again with product regulation (Figure 2.3). After a phase of 
diverse policies, international cooperation introduces a minimum standard in t1. As usual, the 
standard level is the mean (m (t1)). There is no full convergence, as national standards 
above the minimum standard are permitted. Assuming that some countries keep their higher 
standards, the mean shifts upward to m (t2). In t2 regulatory competition becomes effective 
and drives the countries which apply higher standards towards the minimum standard, as 
they want to enjoy the harmonization advantage. As a consequence, the mean m (t2) falls 
back on the minimum standard level (m (t1)). Thus, there is no overall upward shift of the 
mean. Compared to both the isolated effects of minimum harmonization and the opposite 
sequence of interaction the mean is lower.  
Finally, what happens in the case of regulation of production processes if minimum 
harmonization is effective before regulatory competition (Figure 2.4)? As with product 
regulation, the minimum standard leads to some but not full convergence and it raises the 
mean level of standards to m (t2). Regulatory competition drives the countries with stricter 
regulation towards the minimum standard, as a consequence of the downward competitive 
pressure (hypothesis 1.2). Therefore, the picture is exactly as with product standards. After 
an intermediary raise of the mean above the minimum standard to m (t2), it falls back to 
m (t1). Compared to the isolated effects of minimum harmonization the mean level is lower, 
but compared to the opposite sequence of interaction the mean level is higher. 
The interaction of competition and minimum harmonization constrains the positive effects of 
minimum standards and of regulatory competition in the case of product standards, as it 
implies an upper limit at the level of the minimum standard. In the case of process standards, 
the interaction of both effects provides a lower limit to regulatory competition at the level of 
the minimum standard. Thus, given the interaction of cooperation and competition, the 
effects of total and minimum harmonization do not differ. Minimum harmonization is factually 
equivalent to total harmonization.  
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Interaction Hypotheses: Competition and Cooperation 
4.1 Degree of Convergence 
The interaction of international cooperation and regulatory competition leads to the full 
convergence of national policies, irrespective of the type of harmonization, the type of policy, 
and the sequence of interaction. 
4.2 Level of Convergence 
Whenever international cooperation becomes effective before regulatory competition, the mean 
remains at the initial level, irrespective of the type of harmonization. 
Whenever regulatory competition is effective before international cooperation and product 
standards are concerned, the mean regulatory level rises compared to the initial level. 
Whenever regulatory competition is effective before international cooperation and process 
standards are concerned, the mean regulatory level declines compared to the initial level. 
 
3.2 Interaction of Competition and Communication 
Interaction effects of regulatory competition and transnational communication are restricted 
to those countries which are both integrated economically (as members of a common 
market) and interlinked into transnational communication networks. Moreover, interaction 
effects are only relevant for those policies which affect the competitive position of these 
countries.  
In developing hypotheses on the interaction effects of regulatory competition and 
transnational communication, we first differentiate between policy copying (no clear linkage 
between convergence mechanisms and convergence level) and benchmarking (upward shift 
of the regulatory mean). Second, for both constellations we distinguish between process and 
product standards, given their different effects on convergence levels. Third, following 
hypothesis 3.1, we base our analysis on a distinction between countries among which 
convergence effects as a result of transnational communication are more or less likely (given 
different degrees of cultural interlinkages).  
Figure 3 shows the interaction effects for competition and copying. Three countries (B, C, 
and D) are assumed to have close cultural linkages. We assume that for these countries, 
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policy copying is very likely. As it is impossible to theoretically predict the concrete level at 
which convergence through copying takes place, we have illustrated the potential bandwidth 
of convergence levels by grey hatching. To set an example, we have selected a possible 
convergence point within this bandwidth.  
Regardless of the interaction sequence of competition and communication, we expect that 
both mechanisms mutually strengthen each other with respect to the degree of policy 
convergence. Policy convergence as a result of transnational communication is overlapped 
by similar effects of regulatory competition. Countries characterized by strong 
communicative convergence effects will either move simultaneously (in cases where 
communication precedes competition) or converge faster than other countries (in cases 
where competition precedes communication) towards either the top or the bottom, as implied 
by regulatory competition (Figure 3).  
Implicit to this argument is thus the expectation that the extent to which the interaction of 
both mechanisms implies an upward or downward shift of the mean is basically affected by 
regulatory competition rather than policy copying. This statement follows from the above 
differentiation between countries where convergence effects, as a result of transnational 
communication, are more or less pronounced. Policy convergence and hence the reduction 
of regulatory competition between some countries does not exclude that these countries are 
still exposed to competition from other countries where transnational communication has no 
effect on existing regulatory diversity. Hence, it makes no difference which level of 
convergence between the affected countries is implied by transnational communication. The 
major determinant of the convergence level stems from the effects of regulatory competition.  
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Figure 3: Competition and Copying 
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This is no longer the case, however, if the impact of transnational communication rests on 
benchmarking. In contrast to policy copying, this mechanism is expected to result in an 
upward shift of the regulatory mean. Considering the interaction of benchmarking with 
regulatory competition, we arrive at rather different expectations in terms of both the degree 
and level of convergence. As is illustrated in Figure 4, these differences emerge not only 
from the mean shift implied by regulatory competition, but also from the interaction sequence 
between both mechanisms.  
In Figure 4.1 benchmarking precedes regulatory competition and regulatory competition on 
product standards implies an upward shift of the mean. In the first phase, benchmarking is 
expected to lead to policy convergence at a higher level. As not all states will move towards 
the benchmark (assumption 7), m (t2) is expected to lie somewhere in between the level of 
the benchmark and m (t1). It is only as a result of regulatory competition that we can expect a 
further upward mean shift toward the benchmark. This can be traced to the harmonization 
advantages associated with uniform product standards; hence there is an incentive for all 
states to adopt a common standard, as defined by the benchmark. In this case, regulatory 
competition will not only lead to an upward shift of the mean, but also further increase the 
degree of cross-national convergence.  
Expected results are only slightly different if regulatory competition precedes benchmarking 
(Figure 4.3), with the main variation being an even higher convergence level. Regulatory 
competition in the first place leads to convergence and an upward shift of the mean. 
Consequently, subsequent benchmarking occurs at a higher level than in the first sequence, 
because even high-regulating states will have further increased their regulation levels in the 
context of competitive pressures. At the same time, harmonization advantages of uniform 
product standards are expected to yield full convergence at the level of the benchmark. 
The expected results will differ, however, if regulatory competition implies a race to the 
bottom. In Figure 4.2 benchmarking is combined with subsequent competition on process 
regulation. In this case, the final convergence level depends on the relative impact of 
countervailing pressures emerging from benchmarking and economic competition. While 
some states (most probably those for which competitive effects are less pronounced) will 
move towards the benchmark, other countries will enter a race to the bottom. The concrete 
balance of these forces is difficult to predict. Although it is rather likely that regulatory 
competition will imply that m (t3) moves below m (t2), the extent to which m (t3) lies even 
below m (t1) is affected by the number and extent to which states move toward the 
benchmark or the bottom. This way, two convergence levels (benchmark and bottom) are 
predicted. Albeit not leading to full convergence, regulatory competition thus increases the 
overall policy similarity across countries, at least when compared to the initial constellation. 
On the other hand, the emergence of two levels implies a lower degree of convergence, as 
could be expected from the mere impact of regulatory competition.  
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Figure 4: Competition and Benchmarking 
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Two convergence points, albeit at lower levels, are also predicted if regulatory competition 
precedes benchmarking activities (Figure 4.4). Since regulatory competition implies a 
convergent move towards a lower regulatory level, the benchmark will be set at a lower level, 
as it would be the case if regulatory competition was not effective. Assuming again that 
some states move to the benchmark while others converge at the bottom, this scenario 
implies that convergence coincides with a downward shift of the mean; i.e., m (t3) lies below 
m (t1). 
Interaction Hypotheses: Competition and Communication 
5.1 Degree of Convergence 
The interaction of regulatory competition and transnational communication leads to increased 
convergence of national policies, irrespective of the sequence of interaction and the 
mechanisms underlying transnational communication. 
5.2 Level of Convergence 
The interaction of regulatory competition and transnational communication leads to an upward 
shift of the regulatory mean whenever the isolated impact of regulatory competition drives into 
this direction, irrespective of policy type and sequence of interaction. 
If regulatory competition implies a move to the bottom and communication effects emerge from 
benchmarking, convergence will occur at two points, irrespective of the sequence of interaction 
of the mechanisms. In all other constellations, full convergence is expected. 
The interaction of regulatory competition and transnational communication reduces the potential 
of a downward shift of the regulatory mean whenever the isolated impact of regulatory 
competition drives into this direction and communication effects emerge from benchmarking. 
This potential increases when transnational communication is effective before regulatory 
competition. 
 
3.3 Interaction of Cooperation and Communication 
Interaction effects of international cooperation and transnational communication will only be 
observed for countries that are members of both international institutions with obligatory 
potential and transnational communication networks. Moreover, interaction effects are 
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restricted to policies for which international institutions have obligatory potential and which at 
the same time are discussed in transnational networks.  
The theoretical assessment of interaction effects of cooperation and communication is based 
on two analytical distinctions. First, effects differ with the extent to which legal obligation 
implies total or minimum harmonization. Second, the convergence level is also affected by 
the extent to which the relevant mechanism underlying transnational communication is 
based on benchmarking (implying an upward mean shift) or policy copying (where the 
direction of mean change is open).  
The possible constellations for the case of total harmonization are summarized in Figure 5. 
In all constellations, total harmonization implies the full convergence of national policies to 
the level defined in international legislation. The scenarios differ, however, with respect to 
potential mean changes induced by cooperation. No changes of the initial mean m (t1) are 
expected if cooperation is effective before communication (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Subsequent 
benchmarking or copying will have no additional effect, as all countries have already 
switched to similar policy models.  
The situation differs, however, if communication precedes cooperation (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). 
The effectiveness of communication mechanisms before cooperation might imply that 
national levels of regulation shift as a result of benchmarking or copying; hence leading to a 
mean shift in t2. Consequently, subsequent harmonization will occur at another level than in 
the initial constellation. In the case of benchmarking, this will induce an upward shift of the 
mean (Figure 5.3), while for copying, no clear statement is possible (Figure 5.4). Depending 
on the effects of communication, all outcomes in the range between the highest and lowest 
level of initial national regulation are conceivable. To set an example, a possible 
convergence point was selected in Figure 5.4.  
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Figure 5: Total Harmonization and Communication 
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Figure 6 illustrates the interaction effects in the case of minimum harmonization. In contrast 
to total harmonization, the combination of cooperation and communication yields increased, 
but not full convergence of national policies. In terms of convergence levels, however, the 
interaction of both mechanisms bears a higher potential for upward moves, as it is the case 
for total harmonization. This is most apparent in the cases where cooperation interacts with 
benchmarking. Regardless of the interaction sequence, we predict a twofold upward shift of 
the mean. If cooperation precedes communication (Figure 6.1), the first upward move 
emerges from minimum harmonization at the level of the initial mean. While all states below 
the standards will have to move upwards, some high-regulating countries will remain above 
the minimum level; implying that m (t2) lies above m (t1). As subsequent benchmarking 
occurs at the highest national level and some, but not all countries will move towards the 
benchmark (see assumptions 6 and 7), a second increase of the mean is predicted, with 
m (t3) lying between the benchmark and m (t2). The same pattern, albeit in a different 
sequence, is expected if communication becomes effective before cooperation (Figure 6.3).  
If transnational communication is based on copying, however, clear statements about 
expected mean changes are impossible. Whenever communication precedes cooperation, 
the scenario is similar to total harmonization; all outcomes between the highest and lowest 
level of initial national regulation are conceivable (Figure 6.4). The range of potential 
outcomes is reduced, however, in the case of the opposite sequence (Figure 6.2). 
Depending on the specific effects of copying, the minimum standard set at the initial mean m 
(t1) marks the lowest possible level, while the regulatory level of the highest regulating 
country marks the other end of the spectrum. Upward mean shifts are thus rather likely, as 
any moves below m (t1) are excluded by the minimum standard. 
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Figure 6: Minimum Harmonization and Communication 
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Interaction Hypotheses: Cooperation and Communication 
6.1 Degree of Convergence 
The interaction of international cooperation and transnational communication leads to full 
convergence if legal obligation is based on total harmonization, irrespective of the sequence of 
interaction and the mechanisms underlying transnational communication. 
The interaction of international cooperation and transnational communication leads to 
increased, but not full convergence if legal obligation is based on minimum harmonization, 
irrespective of the sequence of interaction and the mechanisms underlying transnational 
communication. 
6.2 Level of Convergence 
The interaction of international cooperation and transnational communication is more likely to 
lead to an upward shift of the regulatory mean if cooperation is based on minimum rather than 
total harmonization. 
The interaction of international cooperation and transnational communication is more likely to 
lead to an upward shift of the regulatory mean if communication is based on benchmarking 
rather than policy copying. 
 
3.4 Interaction of Competition, Cooperation and Communication 
The interaction of all three convergence mechanisms, regulatory competition, international 
cooperation, and transnational communication, is effective for all countries which belong to a 
free trade area, which are members in international organizations with obligatory potential, 
and which are members in transnational communication networks. The scope of 
effectiveness of the interaction of all factors includes those policies which affect the 
competitive position, for which international organizations have obligatory potential, and 
which are discussed in transnational communication networks.  
For three mechanisms there are six distinct sequences of interaction. For each factor two 
sub-classes were distinguished which make a difference for the result: product and process 
standards for regulatory competition, total and minimum harmonization for international 
cooperation, copying and benchmarking for transnational communication. As a consequence 
there are 48 cases where the triple interaction might lead to different results. However, most 
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of these cases need not be analyzed in detail, as they yield results which were already 
discussed in the context of the interaction of two factors.  
This is valid especially for the case of total harmonization. The 24 cases where total 
harmonization is involved can be omitted as the results of these combinations were already 
discussed: 
- First, whenever total harmonization becomes effective before regulatory competition or 
transnational communication, the other mechanisms have no effect at all. Thus, the 
isolated effects of total harmonization apply (see hypothesis 2.1).  
- Second, whenever total harmonization comes in the middle between the other two 
mechanisms, the last mechanism has no effect, and total harmonization fixes the effect 
of the first factor. Thus, the isolated effects of the first mechanisms apply (see section 
3). 
- Third, whenever total harmonization comes last, it fixes the interaction effects of 
regulatory competition and transnational communication. Thus, the analysis of this 
interaction applies (see section 4.2).  
This leaves us with the 24 cases where cooperation takes the form of minimum 
harmonization. Two sequences can be immediately excluded, namely the ones where 
transnational communication becomes only effective after the other two mechanisms. In 
these eight cases, communication has no effect. This is due to the fact that the interaction of 
regulatory competition and minimum harmonization leads to factual total harmonization 
(section 4.1 above). Thus, there is already full convergence and neither copying nor 
benchmarking will lead to a shift of the mean. The results of the interaction of regulatory 
competition and minimum harmonization are decisive.  
For the remaining 16 cases, where transnational communication is the first or second 
mechanism to become effective, again some can be excluded from the discussion, namely 
those where communication takes the form of copying. Whenever copying appears in a 
sequence with regulatory competition, it does not affect the result, as competition is stronger. 
This happens irrespective of the sequence of competition and copying (see section 4.2 
above). Therefore, communication has no effect here, as well. Moreover, the interaction of 
regulatory competition and of minimum harmonization leads to factual total harmonization 
(see section 4.1). This argument applies to three sequences, which include six cases, as for 
regulatory competition product and process standards must be distinguished.  
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As far as copying is concerned, we are left with one sequence and two cases: the sequence 
starts with copying, followed by minimum harmonization and regulatory competition, either 
for product or for process standards. Since copying can lead to convergence at any level of 
regulation within the lowest and highest national regulatory levels, we cannot predict here at 
which level minimum harmonization takes place (see section 4.3). Whatever the level is, 
however, countries will converge to what later becomes the minimum standard. Regulatory 
competition does not affect this result. In case of product standards, the harmonization 
advantage causes the countries to keep their regulation at the minimum level; in case of 
process standards, legal obligation and downward market pressures drive them to the 
minimum level (see section 4.1). There is convergence to the minimum standard, but we do 
not know at which level of regulation.  
We are now left with 8 cases where minimum harmonization and benchmarking interact with 
regulatory competition. The cases are distinct with respect to the sequence of interaction and 
the type of standards, product or process, regulatory competition refers to. We start with 
product standards.  
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Figure 7: Product Standards, Minimum Harmonization and Benchmarking 
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In Figure 7.1 the interaction sequence starts with minimum harmonization, followed by 
benchmarking and regulatory competition. The minimum standard is set at the mean in t1, 
which drives the mean upward to m (t2). The benchmarking process starting in t2 shifts the 
mean further upward to m (t3). Finally, regulatory competition is likely to induce all countries 
to raise their levels of product standards to the benchmark. This is the result of the 
harmonization advantage. Thus, the mean in t4 is at the benchmark, that is, at the highest 
level of national regulations.  
The interaction of cooperation, communication, and competition in case of product standards 
leads to full convergence at the benchmark or top regulatory level. This implies that there is 
a clear upward shift of the mean level of regulation. These results hold true for all possible 
sequences of interaction of minimum harmonization, benchmarking, and competition for 
product standards. As Figure 7 shows, only the speed of convergence and the course of the 
mean shifts differ with the sequences.  
The picture is different in case of process standards. We start again with the sequence 
where minimum harmonization is followed by benchmarking before regulatory competition 
occurs (Figure 8.1). As with product standards, the minimum standard is set at the mean in 
t1. The mean is driven upward first by cooperation (m (t2)) and second by benchmarking 
(m (t3)). Next, however, competition drives the mean down. As developed in section 4.2, 
there will be two points of convergence in this scenario. Some countries will lower their 
standards to the minimum standard as a result of market pressures, whereas others might 
keep their standards at the level of the benchmark. The mean is thus somewhere between 
the minimum standard and the mean before the mechanism of competition became effective 
(m (t3)). As the minimum standard is at the level of m (t1), the mean either remains or shifts 
upward. This combination of factors is therefore relatively effective in setting a lower limit to 
regulatory races to the bottom.  
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Figure 8: Process Standards, Minimum Harmonization and Benchmarking 
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In Figure 8.2, the sequence of minimum harmonization and benchmarking is reversed. In this 
case, benchmarking will shift the mean upward in a first step (m (t2)), and minimum 
harmonization will do so in a second step (m (t3)). The minimum standard is set at m (t2) As 
in the previous case, regulatory competition drives the mean down again. At the end the 
mean is between m (t3) and the minimum standard. There is no full convergence, as some 
countries apply standards at the benchmark level while others apply the minimum standard. 
Compared to the initial situation the mean shifts upward, as the minimum standard lies 
above m (t1). Thus, whenever the benchmark is "secured" by an obligatory minimum 
standard, an upward shift of the mean is possible despite the race to the bottom induced by 
competition. 
What happens when minimum harmonization takes place last? The first case is the one 
where the process starts with regulatory competition (Figure 8.3). Market pressures cause 
countries to lower their standards. There is partial convergence and the mean shifts 
downward to m (t2). On this basis, benchmarking is less effective than in the cases just 
discussed. The benchmark is the highest national standard, which might lie below or above 
the original mean (m (t1)). Still the benchmarking process shifts the mean upward to m (t3), 
as some states will follow the benchmarking country. This mean is fixed by minimum 
harmonization in the next step. As some countries remain at the benchmark, however, 
minimum harmonization is not equivalent to total harmonization in this scenario. The final 
mean (m (t4)) is above the minimum standard but it is likely to lie below m (t1). There is no full 
convergence here, and compared to the initial stage the mean is likely to remain the same or 
to shift downward.  
Finally, in Figure 8.4 the process starts with benchmarking, which shifts the mean to m (t2). 
Regulatory competition drives the mean down again, however, as some countries remain at 
the benchmark, m (t3) is considerably above the bottom line. Minimum harmonization fixes 
m (t3) and draws some countries upward by obligation. The new mean (m (t4)) is above the 
minimum standard as a result of benchmarking. It will be around the original mean (slightly 
above m (t1) in the figure). Again, there are two points of convergence, the benchmark and 
the minimum standard. Thus, whenever competition occurs in early stages of the interaction 
sequence, benchmarking and minimum standards are less effective, as these mechanisms 
start then from a lower regulatory basis. 
The triple interaction of regulatory competition, transnational communication, and 
international cooperation can lead to many different outcomes. Most of them are identical 
with the outcomes of isolated mechanisms or with the outcomes of the interaction of two 
mechanisms. The triple interaction leads to distinct results only if cooperation takes the form 
of minimum harmonization and if the communicative mechanisms is benchmarking.  
I H S —Holzinger and Knill / Competition, Cooperation and Communication — 35 
Interaction Hypotheses: Competition, Cooperation and Communication 
7.1 Degree of Convergence 
Triple interaction of minimum harmonization, benchmarking, and regulatory competition leads to 
full convergence of regulation if product standards are concerned. 
7.2 Level of Convergence 
Triple interaction of minimum harmonization, benchmarking, and regulatory competition leads to 
two points of convergence, one at the minimum standard, and one at the benchmark, only if 
standards for production processes are concerned. 
Triple interaction of minimum harmonization, benchmarking, and regulatory competition leads to 
a clear upward shift of the mean to the top or benchmark level if product standards are 
concerned. 
Triple interaction of minimum harmonization, benchmarking, and regulatory competition is likely 
to lead to an upward shift of the mean if process standards are concerned and regulatory 
competition becomes effective only at the end of the interaction sequence. 
Triple interaction of minimum harmonization, benchmarking, and regulatory competition is likely 
to lead to a downward shift or no shift of the mean if process standards are concerned and 
regulatory competition is first or second in the interaction sequence. 
 
36 — Holzinger and Knill  / Competition, Communication and Cooperation — I H S 
 
Conclusion 
Our theoretical considerations on the causes and conditions of cross-national policy 
convergence in the environmental field indicate several general findings. First, the analysis 
of individual convergence mechanisms and their interaction indicates that fundamental shifts 
in the level of regulation can only be expected in rather specific constellations. Such 
scenarios are restricted to situations in which regulatory competition is the only or dominant 
mechanism to be effective. In all other cases, either upward or downward mean shifts are 
expected to occur on a less dramatic scale.  
In particular, the likelihood for upward shifts generally increases with the extent to which 
benchmarking and minimum harmonization precede potential downward pressures induced 
by regulatory competition. By contrast, downward moves are more likely in constellations in 
which regulatory competition on process regulation becomes effective before cooperation or 
communication.  
Second, the interaction of several mechanisms generally leads to an increase in cross-
national policy convergence. In many instances, combined effects result in full convergence, 
with all affected countries adopting similar policies, or at least convergence at two levels 
(especially in cases where benchmarking overlaps with regulatory competition on process 
standards).  
Third, the broad range of possible convergence levels, as suggested by our theoretical 
considerations, provides a plausible explanation for the rather mixed empirical findings which 
provide limited support for a general race to the bottom as a result of regulatory competition. 
The extent to which this scenario can be expected not only depends on the assumptions 
underlying the different theories of regulatory competition (see Levinson 1997; Wilson 1997), 
but also on possible interaction effects with other convergence mechanisms which might 
weaken or even prevent downward pressures on levels of environmental protection.  
These interaction effects between different sources of policy convergence so far have hardly 
been investigated in the literature. The hypotheses developed in this article thus might 
constitute a promising starting point for empirical research into this field. 
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Annex: List of Assumptions 
 
No. Assumption 
1 The reference point for the analysis is a situation where no mechanism is at work and 
where the policies of the countries under consideration are characterized by diversity. 
2 If another convergence mechanism becomes effective some time after the mechanism 
of regulatory competition, there is increased but not yet full convergence. 
3 All countries fully comply with international law. 
4 The level of international harmonization takes place at the mean of the national 
regulation levels. 
5 In the case of minimum harmonization, not all high-regulating countries will lower their 
standards towards the minimum level. 
6 In the case of benchmarking, the level of the benchmark is equivalent to the highest 
level of national regulation. 
7 In the case of benchmarking, some, but not all countries raise their levels of regulation 
to the benchmark. 
8 For the sake of simplicity, the initial regulatory distance between the countries is equal 
in the graphical illustrations. 
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